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While key negotiation schemes, such as those based on Diffie–Hellman, have been the subject of ongoing research, designing an
efficient and security scheme remains challenging. In this paper, we propose a novel key negotiation scheme based on blockchain,
which can be deployed in blockchain-enabled contexts such as data sharing or facilitating electric transactions between vehicles
(e.g., unmanned vehicles). We propose three candidates for flexible selection, namely, key exchanges via transaction currency
values through value channels (such as the amount in transactions), automated key exchanges through static scripts,and dynamic
scripts, which can not only guarantee key availability with timeliness but also defend against MITM (man-in-the-middle) attacks,
packet-dropping attacks, and decryption failure attacks.
1. Introduction
Key negotiation schemes have been extensively studied
[1–4], including those based on Diffie–Hellman, such as
DH-RSA, DH-DSA, and DH-ECDSA. However, there
appear limited attempts to integrate blockchain in the
design of such schemes given its potential to realize certain
properties. Specifically, blockchain is a technology that uses
hash chains with digital signatures to implement ac-
counting consensus and distributed storage, thus ensuring
traceability and integrity. In recent years, there have been
various applications of blockchain, including in vehicular
communications [5–8].
Although key negotiation is the core supporting tech-
nology of blockchain data encryption, it also has great sig-
nificance for the practical application of blockchain
technology. However, targeted research is still in the initial
stage. At present, some of the Diffie–Hellman protocols faced
with a multitude of problems for vehicular communications:
they cannot resist man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks be-
cause there are no certifications of the other side of the ne-
gotiation; they cannot resist packet-dropping attacks because
the negotiation packages are discarded by enemies, which
caused the negotiation to be incomplete; they cannot resist
decryption failure attacks because keys were not confirmed
and the parties do not know whether the other party has
received the negotiated package.
In this paper, traceable and authenticated key negotia-
tions via blockchain are proposed by exchanging the in-
formation about master keys; that is, they are embedded in
the transaction currency value and can be exchanged
through using value channels, static scripts, and dynamic
scripts. Besides, our proposal solves transaction credit and
security issues. Application of blockchain technology in the
field of electric vehicle trading can effectively solve the
problems of data security, data tampering, history tracking,
effective monitoring, and trading trust. 'e contributions of
the paper are listed as follows:
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(1) We propose traceabe and authenticated key nego-
tiation schemes based on blockchain that can
guarantee key availability with timeliness in vehic-
ular communications, which can defend against
MITM attacks, packet-dropping attacks, and de-
cryption failure attacks
(2) We propose to use value channels, static scripts, or
dynamic scripts for fast, automatic, and confirmable
delivery of key negotiation materials in vehicular
communications, especially, piggyback with normal
payments
'e organization of this paper is as follows. Related work
is introduced in Section 2. 'e system model and adversary
model are presented in Section 3. Section 4 describes our
scheme, and its evaluation and analysis are presented in
Section 5. We conclude the paper in Section 6.
2. Related Work
In recent years, a brief summary of the relevant concepts in
key management was presented. Li et al. [1] proposed a
novel privacy-preserving incentive announcement net-
work based on blockchain via an efficient anonymous
vehicular announcement aggregation protocol. Lei et al.
[9] proposed a framework for providing a secure key
management within heterogeneous network and demon-
strated the efficiency of the framework by providing ex-
tensive simulation and analysis. Besides, Park et al. [2]
proposed a RSU-based decentralized key management
(RDKM), dedicated for the multicast services in the vehicle
communication systems. In addition, they also proposed
the enhanced CDKM (Cell-based Decentralized Key
Management) which improved the rekeying performance
through the reduction of the size of the subgroup [3].
According to the features of health blockchain, Zhao et al.
[10] used a body sensor network to design a lightweight
backup and efficient recovery scheme for keys of health
blockchain, which could be used to protect private mes-
sages on health blockchain effectively. Alagheband and
Aref [11] proposed a dynamic key management framework
based on elliptical curve cryptography and signcryption
method for heterogeneous WSNs. Anita et al. [12] pro-
posed a novel polynomial-based Q composite random
scheme for the establishment of triple key among com-
municating nodes in a network, which enabled a secure
communication between wireless sensor nodes. One of the
fundamental problems in cryptography is the generation of
a common secret key between two legitimate parties to
prevent eavesdropping. To solve the above challenge, Peng
et al. [4] proposed an information-theoretic secret key
generation (SKG) method for time-division duplexing
which based orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing
(OFDM) systems over multipath fading channels. Chen
andWillems [13] proposed a novel construction method to
eliminate the effect of noise and bias in SRAM-PUFs. In
terms of defense against attacks, Bernardini et al. [14]
presented a mechanism to protect differential privacies of
the topology from an eavesdropper who has unauthorized
access to the estimator. Internet of 'ings (IoT) marrying
with vehicle communication is a new topic, and the kinds
of literature are limited. Novo [15] proposed a new ar-
chitecture for arbitrating roles and permissions in IoT. 'e
results showed that the blockchain technology could be
used as access management technology in specific scalable
IoT scenarios. Polyzos and Fotiou [16] explored the po-
tential of a blockchain-assisted information distribution
system for the IoT. 'ey identified key security re-
quirements of such a system and discussed how they could
be satisfied using blockchains and smart contracts. Zhou
et al. [17] proposed a novel blockchain-based threshold IoT
service system, in which servers could process user’s data
by performing homomorphic computations on the data
without learning anything from them. In addition, Eze
et al. [18] proposed a novel CR Assisted Vehicular NET-
work (CRAVNET) framework which empowers CR-en-
abled vehicles to make opportunistic usage of licensed
spectrum on the highways and developed a novel co-
operative three-state spectrum sensing and allocation
model. Zhang et al. [19] presented a novel perspective on
vehicular communication architecture.
With the development of communications and social
vehicles, many researchers have been studying and analyzing
socially aware Internet of Vehicles with the assistance of an
agent-based model intended to reveal hidden patterns
behind superficial data. Malagund et al. [20] discussed the
growth of Internet of 'ings in vehicular communication
and presented surveys of the routing protocols. 'e ap-
plication of blockchain technology in the field of vehicular
communications can effectively solve the problems of data
security, data tampering, history tracking, effective su-
pervision and control, which has broad application fields
and important application value. On the security of ve-
hicular communications on blockchain, since transaction
security and privacy protection issues present serious
challenges, Kang et al. [5] explored a promising consor-
tium blockchain technology to improve transaction se-
curity without reliance on a trusted third party. Pustisek
et al. [6] introduced a concept of autonomous blockchain-
based negotiation to select the most convenient electric
vehicle charging stations. In addition, Yang et al. [7]
proposed a decentralized trust management system in
vehicular networks based on blockchain techniques which
were effective and feasible in vehicular network. Cebe et al.
[8] integrated Vehicular Public Key Management (VPKI)
to the proposed blockchain to provide membership es-
tablishment and privacy. As blockchain technology has
just emerged, the academic research on blockchain privacy
protection and related key management is still in its in-
fancy [21]. In 2015, Zyskind proposed a scheme to protect
personal privacy by using blockchain, but the scheme
focused only on how to construct blocks and implement
authentication of block access and did not give a related
key management scheme. 'e above analyses show that
although the negotiation of data encryption key is the core
supporting technology of blockchain data encryption, it
has great significance for the practical application of
blockchain technology in the field of key negotiations.
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3. Problem Formulation
3.1.MasterKeyNegotiationviaBlockchain. In the scenario of
vehicular communication, the communication between
vehicles and between vehicles and people need to require low
latency, high reliability, and traceability. In order to meet
these requirements, we take the master key information on
blockchain and realize the master key negotiation through
the blockchain. Our scheme is suitable for the scenarios
where there is a need for payment. When the master key
(mk) needs to be changed, exchange the key information in a
certain payment to establish the key for the next secure
communication. 'e following are three options for
implementing master key negotiation, including value
channel, static script, and dynamic script. In this scheme,
there are several parameters for generating the master key,
which are shown in Table 1.
3.2. Adversary Model and Security Requirement. In this
section, we identify five potential vulnerabilities that could
be exploited by an adversary to undermine our scheme: key
leakage, packet-dropping attack, decryption failure attack,
and man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack.
Definition 1 (Packet-Dropping Attack). Key negotiation
packets are dropped by attackers.
Definition 2 (Decryption Failure Attack). One peer of key
negotiation peers decrypts encrypted data packets from the
other peers. As the encrypted key is not acknowledged, it
may be encrypted by a wrong key.
Definition 3 (Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attack). MITM
attacks can intercept normal network communication, as
well as sniff or tamper with data, while the communication
parties are unaware of it. 'at is, attacker acts as an in-
termediary, forming two pairs of keys, decrypting,
encrypting, and forwarding in the middle.
In addition, since our key negotiation scheme is public,
the attacker can gain full knowledge of the procedures and
methods of our scheme.
It is worth noted that there are many deficiencies in the
traditional key negotiations:
(1) It is vulnerable to packet-dropping attacks because
the swap part can be lost or dropped. Since there is
no confirmation mechanism, whether the other
party has successfully negotiated the key is uncertain.
(2) 'e key was not confirmed. 'e parties do not know
whether the other party has received the negotiated
package. Sending encrypted data may cause
decrypting failure with high energy consumption.
(3) It is vulnerable to MITM attacks. 'e third party C
acts as the receiver B when communicating with the
sender A or acts as A when communicating with B.
Both A and B negotiate a key with C; thus, C can
monitor and transmit trade. A MITM attack is de-
scribed as follows:
(a) B sends the public key in a message to A.
(b) C intercepts and analyses the message. Next, C
saves the public key from B and sends a message
to A by using the public key YC of C and dis-
guises as B. After receiving the message from C,
A stores B’s ID and YC together. Similarly,
C uses YC to send a message to B and disguises
as A.
(c) B calculates secret key K1 based on private key XB
and YC. A calculates the secret key K2 based on
the private key XA and YC. C uses private key XC
and YB to compute K1 and uses XC and YA to
compute K2.
(d) From now on, C can forward A’s message to B or
B’s message to A and modify their ciphertext.
Neither A nor B knows that they are sharing
communication with C.
In this paper, we focus on the following security
requirements:
(1) No password is stored in plaintext unless it is placed
in a sufficiently secure cryptographic device. Besides,
no operation on cryptographic devices can make
keys appear outside the cryptographic devices as
plaintext.
(2) To ensure the separation of keys, different com-
munication entities use different keys, and they must
be irrelevant.
(3) Keys need to have a certain backup mechanism. All
transactions are recorded, and the above conditions
can be met by adding a timestamp on blockchain.
(4) Keys must be valid. When the old key expires, it
needs to be replaced in time. At the same time, the
security of the new key and the old key should be
separated. Even if the old key is leaked, the security of
the new key should not be compromised.
4. Proposed Scheme
4.1. Value Channel. 'e proposed scheme utilizes a trans-
action data structure to generate key pairs similar to the
Diffie–Hellman key-exchange process, that is, the mk data
exchange can be completed by embedding the data exchange
process of the mk exchange into the currency value of the
transaction and using the value channel (such as the amount
in the transaction data structure). 'e mk negotiation
process is shown in Figure 1, and the specific imple-
mentation process is as follows:
Table 1: Explanation of parameters in our scheme.
p A large prime number
g A meta of g
T 'e period of generating p and g
mk Master key
sk Session key
OP_Exponent An exponential and modularoperation we defined
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(1) 'e large prime number p and the meta g belong to
system parameters which are placed on blockchain in
advance for a special transaction.
(2) Alice reads blockhead and assigns to p, g; Alice
randomly selects L< a<p, A� ga modp; Alice fills
the left-hand side with 0 so that the total length is 8
such as 0.0...000A, 0.0 . . . 0000g, and 0.0...0000p; 1
btc� 108 cong.
(3) Alice publics broadcast ledger: picks an UTXO that
someone else pays and pays for Bob: a cong, g cong,
and p cong.
(4) After the ledger is recorded in the public ledger, Bob
selects L< b<p and calculates B� gb mod p; Bob fills
the left-hand side with 0 so that the total length is 8
such as 0.0...0000B.
(5) Bob publics broadcast ledger: picks an UTXO that
someone else pays and pays for Alice: B cong.
(6) 'e mk shared by Alice and Bob is Ab modp or Ba
modp, which is used to encrypt subsequent com-
munication between them.
'e specific implementation algorithm is shown in
Algorithms 1–5. Algorithms 1 and 2 show that parameters
are generated and uploaded into blockchain. Algorithm 3
and 4 show the process of generating data for mk negotiation
and uploading to blockchain. Algorithm 5 is a mk generation
algorithm on blockchain. According to above algorithms, it
is worth to know that the time cost of Algorithm 1 is
T+ logp∗ t, t is one time to test prime (p). Assuming the
length of large prime number is n, the success rate of
generating a large prime number in the algorithm is 1/n.
'erefore, the number of attempts to generate a large prime
number in the algorithm depends on the length of the large
Alice
Bob
Select p, g, a
Compute A = ga mod p
Fill 0 on the left so that the
total length is 8
Select b
Compute B = gb mod p
Fill 0 on the left so that the
total length is 8
Pick a UTXO and pay it to
Bob
Pick a UTXO and pay it to
Alice
Figure 1: Master key-exchange process.
Data: Null
(1) while (time() − starttime)>T do
(2) p⟵ random();
(3) while (!IsPrime(p)) do
(4) p⟵ random();
(5) end
(6) g⟵ random()%p;
(7) Transaction⟵ code(p, g);
(8) starttime⟵ time();
(9) end
ALGORITHM 1: System parameters are generated and uploaded into
blockchain (type-I).
Data: Null
(1) p⟵ random();
(2) while (!IsPrime(p)) do
(3) p⟵ random();
(4) end
(5) g⟵ (random()%p);
(6) a⟵ (random()%(p − 1));
(7) A⟵ (ga % p);
(8) Transaction⟵ code(p, g, A);
ALGORITHM 2: System parameters are generated and uploaded into
blockchain (type-II).
Data: p, g
(1) Key initiator:
(2) p⟵ readblock();
(3) g⟵ (readblock()%p);
(4) a⟵ (random()%(p − 1));
(5) A⟵ (ga % p);
(6) Transaction⟵ code(p, g, A);
(7) Submit;
(8) Key receiver:
(9) p⟵ readblock();
(10) g⟵ (readblock()%p);
(11) b⟵ (random()%(p − 1));
(12) B⟵ (gb % p);
(13) Transaction⟵ code(B);
(14) Submit;
ALGORITHM 3: Master key parameters are generated to blockchain
(type-I).
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prime number.'e time complexity of Algorithms 2 and 4 is
O (n). In addition, the time complexity of Algorithms 3 and 5
is O (1).
In order to protect the security of the transaction, such as
negotiating price and electricity sales, it is necessary to
exchange mk-related information by using the value channel
(for example, the amount in the transaction data structure)
and embed the exchange process of mk-related information
into the transaction currency value. In total, our proposal
has the following advantages:
(1) 'e mk exchange process is publicly documented.
(2) 'ere is a timestamp which can be traced.
(3) Since only A (sender) and B (receiver) can determine
the negotiated mk, other users cannot interpret the
message (confidentiality). A knows that only user B
can use this mk to generate a message (authenti-
cation) which protects the security of the transaction
and resists decryption failure attacks.
(4) It is characterized by the fact that the sk is generated
only when needed, which is reducing the chance of
attacks by storing sk for a long time.
In addition, the methods of electric trading in the
existing technology are still faceing the defect of transaction
security. In this paper, we provide a traceable and au-
thenticated mk negotiation via blockchain for vehicular
communications, which is ebbing the data exchange process
of key exchange into transaction currency value, through the
exchange of data which can be accomplished by using the
value channel. It is worth to note that this method satisfies
the following:
(1) 'e two parties which need secure communication
can use this method to determine the negotiated mk.
(2) 'e key-exchange protocol can only be used for the
exchange of mk, but cannot be used for the en-
cryption and decryption of messages. After both
parties determine the mk, the session key sk will be
generated from the master key, sk� hash (mk, last
block header hash).
4.2. Static Scripts. In this section, we discuss the specific
process of sharing information with static scripts. 'e
specific model is shown in Figure 2, and the specific
implementation steps are as follows:
(1) Alice generates a transaction with two outputs: one is
normal P2PKH script (Alice’s public key) with the
number of bitcoins as input and the other is mes-
sageA with zero bitcoins, messageA� {A_len, 4 byte;
g len, 4 byte; p_len, 4 byte; A, A_len byte; g, g len
byte; p, p_len byte; timestamp; type}
(2) Alice uses Bob’s public key to encrypt messageA and
then regards it as the entire output script
(3) Bob confirms receipting the money, finds the
transaction on blockchain, reads messageA, and
parses messageA to get A, g, p
(4) Bob generates a transaction with two outputs: one is
normal P2PKH script (Bob’s public key) with the
number of bitcoins as input and the other is mes-
sageB with zero bitcoins, messageB� {B_len, 4 byte;
B, B_len byte; timestamp; type}
(5) Bob uses Alice’s public key to encrypt messageB and
then regards it as the entire output script
(6) Alice confirms receipting of the money, finds the
transaction on blockchain, reads messageB, and
parses messageB to get B
(7) Alice and Bob use their private keys to generate
redemption scripts to redeem bitcoins
For the above process, we make the following expla-
nations: since it would be costly to put all bitcoins in one
script which contains the data to be exchanged and put them
on blockchain, we design two output scripts. One is a valid
output script that utilizes P2PKH transaction mode so that
the traders can generate redemption scripts, and the other
transaction output contains data which needs to be ex-
changed as an invalid output.
In this paper, the method we proposed has two main
validations. 'e first is whether the public key can be
converted to the correct address, and the second is whether
signature is correct regardless of you are the owner of the
public key. 'e main content of signature is calculating
abstract (the hash of transaction information) by using the
Data: p, g
(1) Key initiator:
(2) p⟵ readblock();
(3) while (!IsPrime(p)) do
(4) p⟵ random();
(5) end
(6) g⟵ (random()%p);
(7) a⟵ (random()%(p − 1));
(8) A⟵ (ga % p);
(9) Transaction⟵ code(p, g, A);
(10) Submit;
(11) Key receiver:
(12) p⟵ readblock();
(13) g⟵ (readblock()%p);
(14) b⟵ (random()%(p − 1));
(15) B⟵ (gb % p);
(16) Transaction⟵ code(B);
ALGORITHM 4: Master key parameters are generated to blockchain
(type-II).
Data: a, b, A, B
(1) p⟵ readblock();
(2) A⟵ decodetransaction();
(3) B⟵ decodetransaction();
(4) mk� (Ab%p)� (Ba%p);
ALGORITHM 5: Master key parameters are generated to a master
key.
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private key. In the case of verification, the signature and
public key are computed. If the transaction abstract is
correctly obtained, the transaction will be successful.
4.3. Dynamic Script. For bitcoin scripts, we customize a
script operator OP_Exponent to implement exponential and
modular operations in the stack so that the existence of
timestamp can satisfy the traceability of exchanging mk.
Since transactions are executed through bitcoin scripts,
packet-dropping attackers cannot discard the negotiation
package, which makes it impossible to complete the nego-
tiation. In addition, the protocol can also be authenticated to
ensure that the other party receives the information and gets
the negotiated mk after passing the authentication correctly.
In other words, our solution can defend against MITM
attacks, packet-dropping attacks, and decryption failure
attacks. Besides, dynamic scripts are more secure and flexible
than static scripts.
Next, we discuss the specific implementation. Alice uses
a UTXO, which has a locked script to set up the transaction.
Besides, Alice puts a, g, and p into the lock script. 'e lock
script is as follows:
1–75 a g p OP_Exponent OP_DUP OP_HASH160
be10f0a . . . OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_CHECKSIG
'e comments of some script statements are shown in
the Table 2.
Bob gives an unlock script and combines unlock script
with lock script to confirm that the transaction is valid; thus,
Bob can get the required data (ga mod p). Since Bob uses the
private key b to generate the required mk, a secure mk
negotiation can be achieved.
However, this solution also faces two challenges. On the
one hand, BVM keeps only the most basic instructions and
extends them unless required. On the other hand, BVM
upgrades require consensus across the bitcoin community
which may cause bifurcations. 'ere are also some problems
we need to solve in future research.
4.4. Session Key Negotiation via Blockchain. Since the key
information cannot be stored in the blockchain all the time,
we propose to divide the key into the master key and the
session key. 'e session key is abolished after use. After the
master key is generated, in the subsequent communication,
the session key (sk) is generated from the master key.
sk�Hash (mk, last block header hash). Since the hash header
is equivalent to a random number generator, sk can auto-
matically change according to the latest block header. In this
way, the times of generating keys through blockchain can be
reduced to C (n, 2). Due to the timestamp, mk and sk can be
traced to provide a guarantee for the security of key nego-
tiation. At the same time, our scheme can realize resistance
packet-dropping attack, decryption failure attack, and MITM
attack which will elaborate in the next section.
4.5. Examples. 'e general vehicle network has two com-
munication modes: communication between vehicle nodes
and roadside infrastructures and communication between
two vehicle nodes. One of the roadside infrastructures is
roadside unit (RSU). 'rough these RSUs, such as 802.11
wireless access points, vehicles can access data stored in the
Alice Bob
P2PKH script (the
public key of Alice)
The number of
bitcoins: the number
of input
EkB{messageA}
The number of
bitcoins: 0
P2PKH script (the
public key of Bob)
The number of
bitcoins: the number
of input
EkA{messageB}
The number of
bitcoins: 0
Analysis messageA
to get A, p, g
Analysis messageB to get B
MessageA = {A_len, 4byte; g_len, 4byte; p_len, 4byte; A, A_len
byte; g, g_len byte; p, p_len byte; time stamp; type;}
messageB = {B_len, 4byte; B, B_len byte; time stamp; type;}
Figure 2: Static scripts.
Table 2: Comments on some statements in scripts.
1–75 Put the next N bytes on the stack, and thevalue of N is between 1 and 75
OP_Exponent Implementing exponential and modularoperations on stack data
OP_DUP Copy the top data and place it on the top ofthe stack
OP_HASH Perform ripemd160 (sha256 (data)) on topof the stack
be10f0a... Bob’s bitcoin address
OP_EQUALVERIFY
Operation which terminates the script in
failure unless the two entries below it on
the stack are equivalent
OP_CHECKSIG Verified signature
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roadside unit or upload their data. When a vehicle enters the
communication range of the roadside node, it can access the
wired network through the roadside node. On the other
hand, the vehicle can also communicate with RSUs via
multihop relay through other vehicles. For example, there
are two cars with a certain distance which need to pass
multiple RSUs, and they have to communicate with each
other; thus, the transmitted information needs to be
encrypted. In this scenario, if the traditional key negotiations
are adopted, this transformation may be subjected to several
attacks such as MITM attacks, packet-dropping attack, and
decryption failure attack. However, those attacks can be
avoided by packing them into the blockchain.
By combining key negotiations with blockchain, the key
exchange process is publicly recorded and timestamped,
which can be traced back to a long time ago.
Since only users and intelligent charging devices can
determine the key, other users cannot interpret the message,
which ensures the confidentiality of the message. In addi-
tion, users know that only intelligent charging devices can
use negotiated keys to generate the message; thus, our
proposal protects the security of electricity trading and
resists decryption failure attacks.
Example 1. Scenario 1: reservation maintenance.
Vehicles can negotiate keys to 4S stores, and 4S stores
automatically distribute keys to vehicles. At the appointed
time, 4S stores confirm the identity of the vehicle by searching
the negotiatedmk on the blockchain and generate sk based on
the latest block header. After the key negotiation is completed,
they can maintain vehicles. In this way, the workload of
people can be reduced. Owing to the existence of timestamp,
the records can be traced back, and the records can be
prevented from being tampered with.
Example 2. Scenario 2: remote fault diagnosis.
In the case of vehicle failure, it is worth discussing how to
overcome the geographical and time constraints and achieve
a collaborative diagnosis of remote experts. Our key ne-
gotiation can be used to find out themk from blockchain and
generate sk based on the latest block header to diagnose the
vehicle when it fails.
Example 3. Scene 3: rent a car (share car).
Recently, more and more shared cars are appearing in
our life. Especially, sharing cars has certain risks because it
needs to connect people, machines, systems, and so on, and
the connection type and quantity are rich and varied. At-
tackers can destroy the in-vehicle network system and realize
the possibility of remotely maneuvering cars to increase
traffic accidents. To prevent this phenomenon, we can take
advantage of the traceability of the blockchain. 'e user
must negotiate the mk with the vehicle (which may be the
transaction amount) and use the vehicle by the generated sk
from mk at the agreed time. Since the usage record can be
found in the ledger, the possibility of an attacker imple-
menting the attack is reduced.
5. Security Analysis and Performance Analysis
5.1. Security Analysis
Proposition 1. The scheme proposed in this paper can resist
MITM attacks.
Proof. Diffie–Hellman key-exchange protocol exists MITM
attacks, supposing there is a third party who desires to steal
A and B’s messages. 'e third party can impersonate the
receiver to get the sender’s A, p, g, select 1< b1<p, construct
B1 � gb1, and get the sender’s key pair K� gab1. Next, the
third party pretends the sender, obtains the receiver’s B,
randomly selects l< a1<p, constructs A1 � ga1, and obtains a
pair of key pairs K� ga1b with the receiver. From now on, C
can forward A’s message to B or B’s message to A andmodify
their ciphertext. Neither A nor B knows that they are sharing
communication with C.
'e MITM attack exists because initiators do not au-
thenticate the other party, but they will authenticate the ne-
gotiating party due to the signature on blockchain. 'erefore,
our proposed scheme can resist MITM attacks. □
Proposition 2. Our proposed key negotiation scheme can
resist packet-dropping attacks.
Proof. Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol exists packet-
dropping attacks, because the negotiated parts may be lost or
dropped. Whether the other party has successfully received
information about the negotiated key and whether two parties
can successfully negotiate the key are uncertain because there
is no confirmation mechanism. However, blockchain can
guarantee the success of the negotiation, that is, each client can
see all parts of the negotiation and both parties can certainly
form a pair of key and confirm that the other party knows the
negotiated key. In addition, due to the timestamp, our scheme
can satisfy the traceability of the negotiated key. □
Proposition 3. ;e scheme we proposed in this paper can
resist decryption failure attacks.
Proof. Diffie-Hellman key-exchange protocol exists de-
cryption failure attacks because the key was not confirmed
and the parties do not know whether the other party has
received the negotiated package. If you send encrypted data, it
may cause decrypting failure with high energy consumption.
In this paper, since only the sender and receiver can de-
termine the key, other demanders cannot interpret the
message (confidentiality). 'e receiver knows that only the
sender can use the key to generate the message to protect the
transaction security and resist decryption failure attacks,
which satisfies the authenticity of the negotiated key. □
Proposition 4. gi (modp)≠gj (modp)(p prime number),
where i≠ j and i, j between 1 and (p − 1), then 325g is the
original root of p.
Proof. Assuming that the number g is the original root of p,
then the result of gi (modp) is different, and there is
Mobile Information Systems 7
1<g<p and 0< i<p, in the final analysis, gp− 1 � 1 (mod p)
is established when and only when the exponent is p − 1
(here p is a prime number). □
Proposition 5. Even if you know p, g, A, and B, it is hard to
guess mk.
Proof. Based on the assumption that DHP is difficult, given
the finite cyclic group G, the generator g, and the randomly
selected elements α� ga and β� gb on G, it is also difficult to
calculate c � gab, so even if we know p, g, A, and B, it is
difficult to deduce K. □
Proposition 6. Our proposed key negotiation scheme is
correct; both sides of the transaction (Alice and Bob) get the
same mk.
Proof. Alice randomly chooses large prime number p and
generators g. Alice randomly chooses L< a<p and calcu-
lates A� ga (mod p). Bob chooses l< b<p and calculates
B� gb (mod p), mk�Ab (mod p)� (ga)b (mod p)� (ga)b
(mod p)� (gb)a (mod p)�Ba (mod p), which shows that
Alice and Bob get the same mk. In addition, because of the
existence of signature, the authenticity of the negotiated key
can be satisfied. □
Proposition 7. sk can automatically change based on the
latest block header and can be traced.
Proof. Since the block header is equivalent to a pseudo-
random number generator, the session key
sk � Hash(mk, last block header hash) (1)
can be guaranteed to be generated randomly. In addition,
due to the timestamp, sks can be traced to enhance the
security of our scheme. □
Proposition 8. ;e cost and time of cracking key negotia-
tions are not feasible in calculation, so the provable safety is
satisfied.
Proof. Due to the complexity of the algorithms involved, it is
tricky to estimate the algorithm accurately, but our analysis
gives some conservative estimates. For the most common
strength of Diffie–Hellman (1024 bits), building a machine
based on dedicated hardware which can crack one Diffie–
Hellman prime every year costs hundreds ofmillions of dollars.
'erefore, we conclude that the cost and time of cracking our
key negotiations are not feasible in calculation. □
5.2. Performance Analysis
Proposition 9. ;e overhead of time and space is low.
Proof. Only mks are generated by the key information on
the blockchain. In the case that the master key does not need
to be changed, it only needs to be generated C (n, 2) times. In
addition, the time cost of Algorithm 1 is T+ logp∗ t, t is one
time to test prime (p). sk can be generated quickly; thus, the
time overhead of key negotiations can be reduced. □
Proposition 10. Assuming the length of a large prime
number is n, the time complexity of the algorithm is O (n).
Proof. Assuming the length of large prime number is n, the
success rate of generating a large prime number in the al-
gorithm is 1/n. 'erefore, the number of attempts to gen-
erate a large prime number in the algorithm depends on the
length of the large prime number. For example, assuming
that the prime length is 100 bits, it usually takes 100 times to
produce a prime number.
According to the comparison of three key negotiations in
Table 3, the existing key negotiation schemes cannot satisfy
traceability, authenticity, or resist some attacks synchro-
nously. When the information recorded on blockchain in-
volves personal privacy, trade secrets, and even national
security, the data must be encrypted and authorized to
access. 'erefore, it brings the following challenge to the
management of data encryption keys: since blockchain ci-
phertext is open, statistical analysis of ciphertext must be
Table 3: Scheme comparison.
Proposed key negotiations
Lei et al. [9] Our scheme Park et al. [2] Our scheme
A secure key management
within the heterogeneous
network
'ree key negotiations
via blockchain
RSU-based decentralized
key negotiation
'ree key negotiations
via blockchain
Analyze the performance of
proposed scheme ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Propose optimization
algorithms ✕
'ree steps to generate
a key
Determine the design
parameters
'ree steps to generate
a key
Defend against MITM
attacks ✓ ✓ ✕ ✓
Defend against packet-
dropping attacks ✓ ✓ ✕ ✓
Defend against decryption
failure attacks ✕ ✓ ✕ ✓
Satisfy traceability of key
exchange ✓ ✓ ✕ ✓
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avoided. While blockchain is used in electronic transactions,
it also faces greater challenges: key leakage, packet-dropping
attack, modify and falsify messages, man-in-the-middle
attack (MITM), and decryption failure attacks. □
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a traceable and authenticated key
negotiation scheme based on blockchain. Specifically, key
exchanges rely on value channels, static scripts, or dynamic
scripts. 'e key materials can be traced back publicly by
timestamps upon request and can be confirmable to avoid
decryption failure attacks. Negotiation peers can be au-
thenticated to resist MITM attacks. 'e packet-dropping
attacks are defended against as the timeliness of key ne-
gotiation can be guaranteed due to the availability of
channels and scripts. Last but not least, the key negotiation
process can be preconfigurable and automatically executed.
Data Availability
We mainly focus on theoretical analysis and do not refer to
data.
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